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Abstract. In a society of completely selfish individuals where every-
body is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, does any equilib-
rium exist for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago
that an equilibrium always exists such that nobody would benefit from
unilaterally changing his strategy. Nash Equilibrium is a central concept
in game theory, which offers a mathematical foundation for social sci-
ence and economy. However, it is important from both a theoretical and
a practical point of view to understand game playing where individuals
are less selfish. This paper offers a constructive generalization of Nash
equilibrium to study n-person games where the selfishness of individuals
can be defined at any level, including the extreme of complete selfishness.
The generalization is constructive since it offers a protocol for individ-
uals in a society to reach an equilibrium. Most importantly, this paper
presents experimental results and theoretical investigation to show that
the individuals in a society can reduce their selfishness level together to
reach a new equilibrium where they can have better payoffs and the so-
ciety is more stable at the same time. This study suggests that, for the
benefit of everyone in a society (including the financial market), the pur-
suit of maximal payoff by each individual should be controlled at some
level either by voluntary good citizenship or by imposed regulations.
1 Introduction
John Nash has proved in 1950 [1] using Kakutani fixed point theorem that any
n-player normal-form game [2] has at least one equilibrium. In the game, each
player has only a finite number of actions to take and takes one strategy at action
playing. If a player takes one of the actions in a deterministic way, it is called a
pure strategy. Otherwise, if a player takes anyone of the actions following some
probability distribution defined on the actions, it is called a mixed strategy. At
a Nash equilibrium, each player has chosen a strategy (pure or mixed) and no
player can benefit by unilaterally changing his or her strategy while the other
players keep theirs unchanged.
Nash Equilibrium is arguably the most important concept in game theory,
which has significant impacts on many other fields like social science, economy,
and computer science. It is an important theory for understanding a common
scenario in game playing.
In a Nash equilibrium, each player’s strategy is completely selfish because the
player is only interested in maximizing his own payoff. Only the best action(s)
to each player is accepted by the player, sub-optimal actions are not considered
at all. The best action is defined as the one with the highest payoff. As a con-
sequence of the selfishness, even if the payoff of a sub-optimal action is slightly
less than the best one, the probability of picking this sub-optimal action by the
player is still zero.
However, many cultures teach people to be less selfish in a society. Also,
the scenario of less-selfish players may be closer to reality, such as individuals
in human societies or animal kingdoms. Our conventional wisdom tells us that
if each of us gives away a bit more in favor of others, we could end up with
more gains as return. That is, reduced selfishness leads to better payoffs for
the individuals in a society. For instance, if we, as drivers, respect other drivers
sharing the same road and give considerations for each other either voluntarily
and/or by following traffic laws, then each of us will end up with a faster, safer
drive to his/her destination than the case when everyone is only interested in
maximizing his own speed to his destination.
This paper presents both experimental results and theoretical investigation
to show that, if the individuals in a society reduce their selfishness by simply
accepting sub-optimal actions in some degree, a new equilibrium can be reached
where better payoffs and social stability are obtained at the same time.
The first key observation of this paper is that, reducing selfishness can im-
prove payoffs. When completely selfish players at a Nash equilibrium reduce their
selfishness, they will shift to a new equilibrium with payoffs possibly better than
the original one. The observations will range from the classic prisoner’s dilemma,
a hard game used in other game theory literatures, to computer generated games
with hundreds to thousands of players. It verifies the conventional wisdom that
reducing selfishness could lead to better payoffs for everyone.
The second key observation is that, reducing selfishness can also improve
social stability. A society of completely selfish individuals can be very sensitive
to perturbations, the accuracy at representing individuals’ utility functions, and
communication errors among the individuals in the society. The smallest change
in utility function or the slightest communication error could knock the indi-
viduals out of their existing equilibrium. Furthermore, a society of completely
selfish individuals can have an enormous number of equilibria. The number may
increase exponentially with the population of the society, The society could end
up with one Nash equilibrium or another, depending on the initial conditions
and sensitive to perturbations. If the individuals reduce their selfishness together,
they can reduce their sensitivity to perturbations, inaccuracy in utility functions,
and communication errors. At the same time, the number of equilibria tends to
drop significantly so that the outcome of the society can be more predictable.
When the selfishness is below a certain level, the society tends to have only one
equilibrium and converges to it with any initial conditions.
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In particular, this paper gives a mathematical model for describing selfish-
ness. The level of selfishness is controlled by one parameter of the model to cover
the spectrum ranging from complete selfishness to complete selfishlessness. With
the parameterized selfishness model, this paper offers a generalization of Nash
equilibrium together with a proof of the existence of an equilibrium given any
selfishness level using a fixed point theorem. It is a generalization because this
paper offers a proof to show that a generalized equilibrium at the particular case
of completely selfish players falls back to a Nash equilibrium. In other words, the
definition of Nash equilibrium is a special case of the generalized one. It is impor-
tant to note that the generalization is constructive because it defines a protocol
for the players in a game to interact with each other so that an equilibrium can
be reached with any selfishness level.
2 A Constructive Generalization
An n-player normal form game is defined as:
– n players 1, 2, . . . , n;
– Each player i has a finite set of strategies Si = {si1, si2, . . . , simi}. Strategies
are also called actions. The Cartesian products of Si, S = S1×S2×· · ·×Sn,
is called the set of the pure strategy profiles (the set of action tuples).
– Each player has a utility function defined as a real value function ui(x)
defined on the set of the pure strategy profiles S, i.e., ui(x) : S → R (a
mapping from each action tuple to a real value).
If player i takes one of the actions from Si in a deterministic way, it is called
a pure strategy. Otherwise, if the player takes any of the actions following some
probability distribution pi defined on the action set Si, it is called a mixed
strategy. That is, for each action xi ∈ Si, the player i takes this action with
a probability pi(xi). A set of (mixed) strategies {p1, p2, . . . , pn}, one for each
player, is called a (mixed) strategy profile p.
Assume that the n players take a strategy profile p. Then the payoff of player
i is defined as
ui(p) =
∑
x∈S
ui(x)
∏
j
pj(xj), for i = 1, 2, . . . , n .
The objective of each player is to maximize his payoff.
A strategy profile excluding the one for player i is denoted as p−i. A strategy
profile p∗ is a Nash equilibrium if for all i and for all pi,
ui(pi, p
∗
−i) ≤ ui(p
∗
i , p
∗
−i) .
That is, no unilateral deviation in strategy by any player gives higher payoff for
that player. Nash’s 1950 PNAS paper proves the existence for an equilibrium for
any finite n-player game using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
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In the following discussions, without loss of generality, we assume all utility
functions are of positive function values, i.e., ui(x) > 0, for any x ∈ S.
If player i takes an action xi ∈ Si in response to other players strategies p−i,
the payoff is ui(xi, p−i). The optimal action x
∗
i for the player i is defined as the
one with the highest payoff, i.e.,
ui(x
∗
i , p−i) = max
xi∈Si
ui(xi, p−i) .
Obviously,
ui(pi, p−i) =
∑
xi∈Si
pi(xi)ui(xi, p−i) .
One of the important properties of a Nash equilibrium p∗ is that only the
optimal action(s) has non-zero probability, i.e., if p∗i (xi) > 0, then xi must be
the optimal action for the player i. In other words, player i is completely selfish
because he only accepts the optimal action for himself.
Assume that, at a time instance t, the strategy profile excluding the one for
player i is p−i(t), the action payoff for player i is ui(xi, p−i(t)), for xi ∈ Si. Based
on the above observation, we can define a mathematical model to formulate the
construction of the next time strategy pi(xi, t + 1) for player i based on his
action payoff ui(xi, p−i(t)) at the current time t. Specifically, we can construct
pi(xi, t+ 1) such that it is proportional to ui(xi, p−i(t)), e.g.,
pi(xi, t+ 1) ∝ (ui(xi, p−i(t)))
α
, for xi ∈ Si ,
where α is a parameter of a non-negative value. Since pi(xi, t + 1) should be
normalized as a probability, the above formula can be rewritten as
pi(xi, t+ 1) =
(ui(xi, p−i(t)))
α∑
xi∈Si
(ui(xi, p−i(t)))
α , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n . (1)
In (1), when α → ∞, the best action has a non-zero probability while oth-
ers have probability zero. That is, the player only accepts the best action, the
one with the highest payoff ui(xi, p−i). It is exactly same as the case of Nash
equilibrium described before.
If the value of α is reduced from the above extreme case, the player i starts to
accept sub-optimal actions by assigning non-zero probability to them. The degree
of the acceptance increases with further decrease of α. At another extreme case,
when α→ 0, each action is assigned with the same probability and the player has
no preference on any one of the actions. All of the actions are treated equally and
they are sampled uniformly. In this case, the player is completely selfishless. In
summary, the parameter α describes the selfishness level of player i. It covers the
spectrum ranging from complete selfishness (α→∞) to complete selfishlessness
(α = 0).
In the special case of α → ∞, the game playing defined by the constructive
generalization (1) is the same in principle as fictitious play introduced by G.W.
Brown in 1951 [3]. In fictitious play, each player takes the optimal action(s) in
respond to the strategies of other players.
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Definition 1. Given a non-negative real value for the selfishness level α, i.e.,
α ≥ 0. If the iterative computation defined by (1) reaches an equilibrium, that
is, there is a strategy profile p∗ satisfying
p∗i (xi) =
(
ui(xi, p
∗
−i))
)α∑
xi∈Si
(
ui(xi, p∗−i)
)α for i = 1, 2, . . . , n , (2)
then the strategy profile p∗ is called a generalized equilibrium.
In parallel with Nash’s 1950 PNAS paper, the proof of the existence of a gen-
eralized equilibrium given any selfishness level is provided below. Furthermore,
it will be shown that when the selfishness level is sufficiently high, a generalized
equilibrium falls back to a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. A generalized equilibrium p∗ defined by (2) exists for any n-player
normal form game with any selfishness level α of a non-negative value (α ≥ 0).
It is still true even if each player i in the game has his own selfishness level αi,
possibly different from the rest.
Proof. The set of iterative equations (1) defines a mapping from the strategy
profile set to itself. Because the set is compact and the mapping is continuous,
so a fixed point exists based on Brouwer fixed point theorem.
The second part of this theorem tells us that, for any n-player normal form
game, even if the selfishness level is different from player to player, a generalized
equilibrium still exists for the game.
It is important to note that (2) defines a system of polynomials if α is an
integer. If it is also an even number, then any real value solution to this system,
which must also be a positive solution, is also a generalized equilibrium for
the game playing. Also, the game playing defined by (1) can be treated as an
iterative, direct method to find an equilibrium of the game playing. It defines
a protocol for the players in a game to interact with each other so that an
equilibrium can be reached with any selfishness level. Following this protocol,
each player only needs to know his own utility function and the strategies of
other players at the current time to compute his strategy for the next time. The
strategies of other players can be obtained through either statistical learning or
message passing among the players.
Theorem 2. When the selfishness level α is sufficiently large, i.e., α → ∞,
any generalized equilibrium defined by (2) can be arbitrarily close to a Nash
equilibrium and vice versa.
The proof is given in the subsection 5.1 in the Appendix.
As a consequence, any real value solution to the system of polynomials defined
by (2) with a large even number for α can be served as a good approximation
to a Nash equilibrium. Alternatively, the game playing defined by (1) with a
sufficiently large α can be applied directly to reach an equilibrium which can
also be served as a good approximation of a Nash equilibrium.
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When α → ∞, from (1) we can see that pi(xi, t+ 1) is no longer a continu-
ous function of ui(xi, p−i(t)). In this case, any mixed strategy can be extremely
unstable for the slightest change in ui(xi, p−i(t)) caused by the inaccuracy at
representing the utility functions, the variation of the utility functions, any per-
turbation and communication error among the players. For example, a small
variation in the utility function could lead to a dramatic shift of the equilib-
rium from one point in the strategy profile space to another one. It is hard for
an algorithmic method to converge to an unstable equilibrium purely based on
iterations.
Even if a game of completely selfish players can reach an equilibrium, it may
have an enormous number of equilibria, possibly growing exponentially with
the number of the players of the game. The players could get stuck into one
Nash equilibrium or another, depending on the initial conditions and sensitive
to perturbations. How to reach an equilibrium which gives relatively good overall
payoff for the game becomes a challenging problem (the overall payoff for a game
is defined as the summation of the players’ payoffs, i.e.,
∑
i ui(x, t)).
As a summary, we can say that complete selfishness of the players in a game
may lead to the difficulty for the players to reach an equilibrium. Even if an equi-
librium is found, it could also be unstable, sensitive to perturbations, sensitive
to inaccuracy or variations in utility functions, and vulnerable to communica-
tion errors. Furthermore, the overall payoff of the game may be ignored due to
the fact that each player only tries to maximize his own payoff. It is desirable to
improve the overall payoff for a society because it stands for improved individual
payoff on average. Also, everyone in the society could benefit from the improved
overall payoff if some social welfare system is implemented to redistribute the
social wealth. Can we improve the overall payoff and the stability of a game
playing by simply reducing the selfishness level of the players in the game?
Both experimental result in the following section and a theoretical investiga-
tion in Appendix (subsection 5.2) will affirm the above question. The theoretical
investigation shows that the game playing defined by the constructive gener-
alization (1) is a variation of a global optimization algorithm [8] defined by
a multi-agent system. When the value of the parameter α is reduced below a
certain threshold, the global optimization algorithm has one and only one equi-
librium and converges to it with an exponential rate. If the equilibrium is also a
consensus one among all the agents, then it must be the global optimum, guar-
anteed by theory. Above the threshold, the number of equilibria of the global
optimization algorithm may grow with the value of the parameter α. That is, the
algorithm becomes less stable with the increase of α, but the chance of reaching
a consensus increases, however.
The theory suggests that reducing the selfishness level from the extreme
of complete selfishness can stabilize the game playing and possibly improve the
overall payoff. The experiments in the next section verifies that the overall payoff
for many games is best in a statistical sense at a certain level of selfishness,
neither at the complete selfishness one nor at the complete selfishlessness one.
Applying this to social situations, it suggests that a society should let some level
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of selfishness remain in its individuals. Otherwise, nobody has any motivation
to pursue better payoffs. Also, it is not recommended to take the other extreme
where everyone is completely selfish. However, how to find the best selfish level
for any game remains as an open question.
3 Experimental Results
The prisoner’s dilemma constitutes a basic problem in game theory. It is a typical
non-zero-sum game in which two players can either “cooperate” or “defect” the
other player. In this game, the only concern of each individual player (“prisoner”)
is to maximize his/her own payoff. Regardless of what the opponent chooses, each
prisoner always receives a higher payoff by defecting; i.e., defecting is the strictly
dominant strategy. Therefore, the only possible Nash equilibrium for the game
is for all prisoners to defect.
An example payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma is given as follows:
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3,3 1,4
Defect 4,1 2,2
At the Nash equilibrium (the element in the matrix with a bold font), the
payoffs of the two players are (2,2). It corresponds to the case when the selfishness
level α =∞. When the two players reduce their selfishness level together, their
payoffs at equilibria also increase together as shown in Figure 1. Those equilibria
are found by the constructive generalization (1) with different selfishness levels.
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Fig. 1. Payoffs of prisoner’s dilemma under different selfishness levels.
7
From Fig. 1 we can see that when the two players have the same selfishness
level and the level is of a high value (α = 30), their payoffs are close to those of
the Nash equilibrium. The moment that the both players reduce their selfishness
level, both get better payoffs than those of the Nash equilibrium. When the
selfishness level reduces to one (α = 1), the payoffs are close to 2.4 for both, a
20% increases over the one of the Nash equilibrium.
The result seems counterintuitive because if one player could update his
strategy to improve his payoff, he should go ahead to do it in order to receiving
a better payoff. However, in many cases, all the players in a game are inter-
connected. The gain of one player often leads to the loss of other players. If
everyone yields back a little bit of his payoff as a favor to others, everyone can
end up with better payoff as a returned favor from others instead.
To show the power of the constructive generalization at finding Nash equi-
libria, a 2-player game is used with the following payoff matrix:

2, 3 − 1, 4 2, 4 5, 2 1,−1
2, 2 3, 0 4, 1 − 2, 4 1, 3
4, 6 7, 2 2,−2 4, 9 2, 1
9, 0 − 2, 6 6, 3 7, 0 0, 5
3, 2 6, 1 2, 5 5, 3 1, 0


This game has been used in other game theory literatures as a hard game
because it has only one mixed Nash equilibrium. The strategy for the row
player is (0, 0, 211 ,
4
11 ,
5
11 ) with the payoff 4. The strategy for the column player
is (0, 27 ,
3
7 ,
2
7 , 0) with the payoff 3. This mixed Nash equilibrium is extremely
unstable. Assume that the two players play the game by taking only the best
action. Assume further that the column player couldn’t represent fraction num-
bers. Instead, the player uses real values to approximate them, just like the real
values stored in most computers. Then, a very slight round-off error for the value
3
7 , say 0.4285714285714285714285714286, could knock the row player off of his
Nash equilibrium strategy to the new one (0, 0, 0, 1, 0), which will in turn knock
the column player off his Nash equilibrium strategy. As a consequence, both of
them will immediately be knocked off the Nash equilibrium and get stuck into
a chaotic situation. Therefore, this game is hard for an iteration-based direct
method to reach the unique mixed Nash equilibrium.
Despite of its hardness, the constructive generalization (1) as an iteration-
based direct method can find a very good approximation to the Nash equilibrium.
To improve the convergence property of the method, an additional step is added
after computing pi(xi, t) defined by (1) to smooth out its fluctuation. It is done
by keeping some memory of the previous value of pi(xi, t), i.e.,
λpi(xi, t+ 1) + (1− λ)pi(xi, t)→ pi(xi, t+ 1) ,
where λ = 0.001 was used in the experiment.
Furthermore, to increase the chance for the constructive generalization to
reach an equilibrium at a high selfishness level α, the value of α is progressively
raised from a small value, say 1. When it reaches the value 1000, the payoff for
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the row player is 4.0068, a difference around 0.17% to the payoff 4 of the Nash
equilibrium. His strategy (left) is very close to the Nash equilibrium one (right)
as shown below:
(0, 0,
1.999
11
,
3.999
11
,
5.002
11
) ≈ (0, 0,
2
11
,
4
11
,
5
11
) .
The payoff for the column player is 3.0001097, a difference around 0.0037% to
the payoff 3 of the Nash equilibrium. His strategy (left) is very close to the Nash
equilibrium one (right) as shown below:
(0,
1.997
7
,
2.981
7
,
2.023
7
, 0) ≈ (0,
2
7
,
3
7
,
2
7
, 0) .
.
Fig. 2 shows the changes of the payoffs of the two players in relation to the
selfishness level. The payoff of the row player is peaked around α = 8 with the
value 4.77572, The payoff of the column player is peaked around α = 5 with
the value 3.30341. At α = 7, the payoffs for both are (4.7586, 3.2527), a 19%
improvement for the row player and a 8.4% improvement for the column player
over the payoffs (4, 3) of the Nash equilibrium.
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Fig. 2. Payoffs of two players with 5 actions under different selfishness levels.
To illustrate the power of the constructive generalization (1) at stabilizing
game playing, a 2-players game with 6 actions for each is constructed with the
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following payoff matrix:


6, 6 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1
1, 1 6.5, 6.5 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1
1, 1 1, 1 7, 7 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1
1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 7.5, 7.5 1, 1 1, 1
1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 8, 8 1, 1
1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 8, 8.5


Clearly, this game has six actions for each player and six pure Nash equilibria.
Let us label the actions for each player as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. If any player picks the
ith action in random, the other will take the same action as the best response.
As a consequence, a Nash equilibrium is thus found.
With this best-response playing, the average payoff for each player is 7.725,
the variance of the payoff is 35/48 ≈ 0.729. Three hundred generalized equilibria
are found using the constructive generalization (1) with the selfishness levels
α = 100, 4, 2, 1, respectively. The results for α = 100, 4, 2 are shown in Fig. 3,
Fig. 4, and Fig. 5 respectively. From the figures we can see that the stability of the
game playing defined by the constructive generalization improves progressively
as the selfishness level α decreases. Here, the stability is reversely proportional
to the variance of the payoff. When α = 1, the game playing always converges to
a unique equilibrium with the payoff=2.10373 after three hundred runs. That is,
the game playing tends to have only one equilibrium when the selfishness level
drops below a certain threshold. Also we can see from the three figures that the
average payoff of each player is of the highest value when α = 4.
From this example, we can see that the constructive generalization yields the
best payoffs for the players in a game at a certain selfishness level. The stability
of the game playing continuously improves as the selfishness level reduces. That
is, reducing the selfishness level can always improve the stability of the game
playing. However, the players in a game can only get the highest payoffs at
a statistical sense at a certain selfishness level (In the subsection 5.2 in the
Appendix, a theoretical investigation is given to offer some explanation).
In the following set of experiments, computer-generated societies with a pop-
ulation ranging from hundreds to a thousand are used to demonstrate the im-
provement of payoffs and stability by reducing the selfishness level. In each soci-
ety, each individual has a number of neighbors and his payoff function is defined
by the summation of the pairwise joint actions of himself and his neighbors as
follows
ui(x) =
∑
j∈N (i)
fij(xi, xj) , (3)
where N (i) is the set of the individual i’s neighbors. The overall payoff of the
society is defined as
∑
i
ui(x) =
∑
i
∑
j∈N (i)
fij(xi, xj) .
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Fig. 3. Overall payoffs of 300 generalized Nash equilibria with the selfishness
level α = 100. The average µ = 7.728 and variance σ2 = 0.502.
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Fig. 4. Overall payoffs of 300 generalized Nash equilibria with the selfishness
level α = 4. The average µ = 7.910 and variance σ2 = 0.379.
11
55.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
1 14 27 40 53 66 79 92 105 118 131 144 157 170 183 196 209 222 235 248 261 274 287 300
Equilibrium Number
O
v
ea
ll 
Pa
yo
ff
Fig. 5. Overall payoffs of 300 generalized Nash equilibria with the selfishness
level α = 2. The average µ = 6.888 and variance σ2 = 0.193.
Each function value fij(xi, xj) is uniformly sampled from the interval [0, 1].
The neighbors of each individual are randomly picked from the entire population.
In the first experiment, an instance of a society of 121 individuals is generated
where each one has 50 actions and 6 neighbors on average. 300 Nash equilbria
are discovered by fictitious play and 300 generalized ones are discovered by the
constructive generalization with the selfishness level α = 20. Fig. 6 shows the
overall payoffs of the first 300 ones versus the second 300 ones. From the figure we
can see that, reducing the selfishness level can lead to remarkable improvement
both in payoffs and stability.
In the second experiment, the population is increased to 601, the number
of actions per person is reduced to 20, and the size of neighbors on average is
increased to 30. Figure 7 shows the overall payoffs of 300 Nash equilibria versus
the 300 generalized ones with the selfishness level = 20. From the figure we can
see that, reducing the selfishness level can lead to remarkable improvement both
in payoffs and stability with a larger population.
In the third experiment, the population is increased further to 1001, the
number of actions per person is reduced to 10, and the size of neighbors on
average is increased to 50. From Figure 8 we can make the same conclusions as
above with an even larger population.
The last three experiments with societies of different population sizes are
extended with more selfishness levels. The average overall payoff and the fluc-
tuation of the overall payoff of a society with different selfishness levels α are
shown in the following table. The fluctuation is indicated by the variance of the
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Fig. 6. Overall payoffs of 300 Nash equilibria (bottom) versus 300 generalized
ones (top, the selfishness level α = 20) for a society of 121 individuals. For
the former, the average µ = 600.67 and variance σ2 = 17.5. For the latter, the
average µ = 622.60 and variance σ2 = 10.7.
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Fig. 7. Overall payoffs of 300 Nash equilibria (bottom) versus 300 generalized
ones (top, the selfishness level α = 20) for a society of 601 individuals. For
the former, the average µ = 11766 and variance σ2 = 1009. For the latter, the
average µ = 11899 and variance σ2 = 392.
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Fig. 8. Overall payoffs of 300 Nash equilibria versus 300 (bottom) generalized
ones (top, the selfishness level α = 30) for a society of 1001 individuals. For
the former, the average µ = 30274 and variance σ2 = 3335. For the latter, the
average µ = 30677 and variance σ2 = 818.
overall payoff given a selfishness level. The less fluctuation a society has, the
more stable the society is.
Population Size 121 601 1001
Selfishness Level Payoff Fluctuation Payoff Fluctuation Payoff Fluctuation
∞ 601 17.5 11766 1009 30274 3335
100 611 16.9 11883 591 30487 1371
80 611 15.7 11902 516 30575 1296
60 613 13.2 11939 471 30523 1151
50 615 13.0 11956 461 30612 1069
40 617 10.1 11983 455 30649 1029
30 619 10.1 12014 411 30677 818
20 623 8.68 11899 392 30360 681
10 458 0 10276 0 27988 0
From the above table, we can see that the overall payoffs of the three societies
improve progressively with the reduction of the selfishness level α started from
α = ∞ (complete selfishness). Each society yields the highest overall payoff
at a some selfishness level and degrades progressively with further reduction
of the selfishness level. The stability of each society continuously improves as
the selfishness level reduces. That is, reducing the selfishness level can always
improve the stability of a society. This experiment shows us that a less selfish
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society can be better in overall payoff and stability than a completely selfish
society.
A less selfish society can also be more efficient than a completely selfish
society. The efficiency of a society can be measured by the capability at finding
a good equilibrium in terms of the overall payoff. To compare the efficiency, the
same society of a population of 121 described before is used in the experiment.
When the individuals in the society are less selfish (α = 20), the average overall
payoff of the 300 equilibria found by the society is 622.60 (see also Fig. 6).
When all the individuals become completely selfish, after exploring one million
of equilibria by the society, the best overall payoff is of a value 621.5, less than
the former one 622.60. This result says that the average payoff of the less selfish
society in a generalized equilibrium is better than the best payoff out of those
of one million Nash equilbria explored by the completely selfish society. The less
selfish society spent seconds on average to find an equilibria while the completely
selfish society took almost a whole day to find the one million equilibria using a
laptop with a AMD TurionTMX2 Dual-Core Mobile Processor and 3GB RAM.
The less selfish society is several orders of magnitude more efficient than the
completely selfish society.
Fig. 9 shows the improvement of the best overall payoff with the increase of
the number of equilibria discovered by the completely selfish society mentioned
above.
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Fig. 9. After exploring one million equilibria by a society of 121 completely
selfish individuals, the best one in terms of overall payoff still couldn’t match
the average one (dotted line) found by the same society when all the individuals
are less selfish.
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4 Conclusions
John Nash in his Nobel price-winning work defined an equilibrium and proved
its existence for n players games where all players are completely selfish. How-
ever, it is important from both a theoretical and a practical point of view to
understand game playing where players are less selfish. The key contribution of
this paper is a generalization of Nash equilibrium to cover the entire spectrum of
selfishness ranging from complete selfishness to complete selfishlessness. It also
gives the proof of the existence of an equilibrium for a game of n-players with
any selfishness level. The definition of Nash equilibrium is a special case of this
generalization where all players are completely selfish. The generalization is con-
structive since it offers a protocol for players in a game to reach an equilibrium.
Most importantly, this paper presents experimental results and theoretical in-
vestigation to show that the players in a game can reduce their selfishness level
together to reach a new equilibrium where they can have better payoffs and the
game playing is more stable at the same time.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof for Theorem 2
Definitions and Notations At time instance t, let ui(xi, p−i(t)) be the payoff
of player i by taking action xi in response to other players’ strategies p−i(t). It
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is a function of xi and t, called the action payoff function, denoted as Ψi(xi, t).
Obviously, we have
Ψi(xi, t) = ui(xi, p−i(t)) =
∑
∼xi

ui(x)∏
j 6=i
pj(xj , t)

 , for any i . (4)
Using the notation, the constructive generalization (1) can be rewritten as
pi(xi, t+ 1) =
(Ψi(xi, t))
α∑
xi∈Si
(Ψi(xi, t))
α , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n . (5)
That is, pi(xi, t + 1) equals to the normalized (Ψi(xi, t))
α. To show the rela-
tionship, pi(xi, t) can be expressed as
(
Ψ¯i(xi, t)
)α
with the bar standing for the
normalization. That is,
pi(xi, t+ 1) =
(
Ψ¯i(xi, t)
)α
, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n . (6)
Substituting (6) into (4), we have an iterative update function for Ψi(xi, t) as
follows
Ψi(xi, t+ 1) =
∑
∼xi

ui(x)∏
j 6=i
(
Ψ¯i(xi, t)
)α , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n . (7)
If a strategy profile p∗ is a generalized equilibrium satisfying (2), then there
is a corresponding set of action payoff functions {Ψ∗1 (x1), Ψ
∗
2 (x2), . . . , Ψ
∗
n(xn)}
defined by (4), or simply Ψ∗, such that (7) is satisfied. That is,
Ψ∗i (xi) =
∑
∼xi

ui(x)∏
j 6=i
(
Ψ¯∗j (xj)
)α , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n . (8)
Both a strategy profile p∗ satisfying (2) and an action payoff function set Ψ∗
satisfying (8) can be used to represent a generalized equilibrium. Based on (4),
we have
Ψ∗i (xi) =
∑
∼xi

ui(x)∏
j 6=i
p∗j(xj)

 , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n .
Based on (6), we have
p∗i (xi) =
(
Ψ¯∗i (xi)
)α
, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n .
The Proof The best action of player i at time t is defined as the one with the
highest payoff, i.e., the xi that maximizes the action payoff function Ψi(xi, t).
Assume that the total number of actions of player i is mi. Assume further that
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α ≥ 1. At a generalized equilibrium with a strategy profile p∗ and its correspond-
ing action payoff function set as Ψ∗, based on (8), we can find out the difference
between the best payoff maxxi Ψ
∗
i (xi) and the expected payoff
∑
xi
Ψ∗i (xi)p
∗
i (xi).
It is straightforward to verify that the difference should satisfy the following in-
equality:
0 ≤ max
xi
Ψ∗i (xi)−
∑
xi
Ψ∗i (xi)p
∗
i (xi) <
(
mi − 1
e
max
xi
Ψ∗i (xi)
)
α−1 .
Obviously, the difference can be arbitrarily small when the parameter α is suffi-
ciently large. That is, the difference is reduced to zero when α→∞,
lim
α→∞
(
max
xi
Ψ∗i (xi)−
∑
xi
Ψ∗i (xi)p
∗
i (xi)
)
= 0, for any i . (9)
Given a strategy profile p∗, it is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, given any
player, its best payoff is equal to its expected payoff
∑
xi
Ψ∗i (xi)p
∗
i (xi). That is,
for any i,
max
xi
Ψ∗i (xi)−
∑
xi
Ψ∗i (xi)p
∗
i (xi) = 0 . (10)
Compare the statement (9) with the statement (10), we can conclude that
any generalized equilibrium (8) can be arbitrarily close to a Nash equilibrium if
the parameter α is sufficiently large.
The other way around is also true. That is, for any Nash equilibrium, there
exists a generalized equilibrium defined as (8) which is arbitrarily close to the
Nash equilibrium if the parameter α is sufficiently large. To prove this statement,
recall that the action payoff function Ψi(xi) computed by (7) is the payoff of
player i taking the action xi while other players taking the strategies pj (j 6= i).
Assume that a strategy profile p∗ is a Nash equilibrium. Then the payoff Ψ∗i (xi)
at the Nash equilibrium should satisfy the following condition,
max
xi
Ψ∗i (xi) = Ψ
∗
i (xi), if p
∗
i (xi) > 0 ;
max
xi
Ψ∗i (xi) ≤ Ψ
∗
i (xi), if p
∗
i (xi) = 0 .
Let ǫ is a positive infinidesmal. Note that for any probability pi, if 0 < pi ≤ 1,
then
lim
ǫ→0+
(1 + ǫ ln pi)
1/ǫ = pi .
Otherwise, if pi = 0, then
lim
ǫ→0+
(1 + ǫ ln ǫ)1/ǫ = pi(= 0) .
Given each player i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, define its action payoff function Ψ
′
i (xi)
as
Ψ
′
i (xi) =


(1 + ǫ ln p∗i (xi))maxxi Ψ
∗
i (xi), if p
∗
i (xi) > 0 ;
(1 + ǫ ln ǫ)maxxi Ψ
∗
i (xi), if p
∗
i (xi) = 0 and maxxi Ψ
∗
i (xi) = Ψ
∗
i (xi) ;
Ψ∗i (xi), if Ψ
∗
i (xi) < maxxi Ψ
∗
i (xi) .
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Obviously,
lim
ǫ→0+
Ψ
′
i (xi) = Ψ
∗
i (xi) .
Let α = 1/ǫ, from (5) used for computing the strategy pi(xi, t), we have
lim
ǫ→0+
(
Ψ
′
i (xi)
)1/ǫ
∑
xi
(
Ψ
′
i (xi)
)1/ǫ = p∗i (xi), for i = 1, 2, . . . , n .
Hence, the set of action payoff functions {Ψ
′
1(x1), Ψ
′
2(x2), . . . , Ψ
′
n(xn)} is a gen-
eralized equilibrium satisfying (8) when the parameter α is sufficiently large. Its
corresponding strategy profile {p∗1(x1), p
∗
2(x2), . . . , p
∗
n(xn)} is the strategy pro-
file p∗ of the Nash equilibrium in the assumption. In other words, for any Nash
equilibrium with a strategy profile p∗, there always exists a generalized equilib-
rium satisfying (2) which is arbitrarily close to the Nash equilibrium when the
selfishness level α is sufficiently large.
5.2 Theoretical Investigation
From Cooperative Optimization to the Constructive Generalization
The constructive generalization can be derived from a recently discovered general
global optimization method, called cooperative optimization [8]. Cooperation is
an ubiquitous phenomenon in nature. The cooperative optimization theory is a
mathematical theory for understanding cooperative behaviors and translating it
into optimization algorithms. The major theoretical results can be found in [8].
Let E(x1, x2, . . . , xn), or simply E(x), be a multivariate objective function of
n variables. Assume that E(x) can be decomposed into n sub-objective functions
Ei(x), one for each variable, such that those sub-objective functions satisfying
E1(x) + E2(x) + . . .+ En(x) = E(x) .
In terms of a multi-agent system, let us assign Ei(x) as the objective function
for agent i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. There are n agents in the system in total. The
objective of each agent i is to maximize Ei(x). The objective of the system is to
maximize E(x), called the global objective function.
There is a simple form of cooperative optimization where each agent i is
associated with a function Ψi(xi, t) defined on the variable xi and time t. The
function is called the assignment function for the agent. Each agent updates its
assignment function iteratively as follows:
Ψi(xi, t) =
∑
∼xi

eEi(x)/~∏
j 6=i
pj(xj , t− 1)

 , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (11)
where
∑
∼xi
stands for the summation over all variables except xi and ~ is a
constant of a small positive value. pi(xi, t) is defined as
pi(xi, t) =
(Ψi(xi, t))
α∑
xi
(Ψi(xi, t))
α , (12)
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where α is a parameter of a non-negative real value.
By the definition, pi(xi, t) is a probability-like function satisfying∑
xi
pi(xi, t) = 1 .
It is, therefore, called the assignment probability function. It defines the soft
decisions for assigning variable xi at the time instance t. If a variable value xi
is of a higher function value pi(xi, t), then it is more likely to be assigned to the
i-th variable than any other value of a lower function value.
The assignment function Ψi(xi, t) is also called the assignment state function,
representing the state of agent i at the time instance t. From (12) we can see
that the assignment probability function pi(xi, t) is defined as the assignment
state function Ψi(xi) to the power α with normalization.
With the bar notation for normalization introduced in the subsection 5.1,
the iterative update function (11) can be rewritten as
Ψi(xi, t) =
∑
∼xi

eEi(x)/~∏
j 6=i
(
Ψ¯j(xj , t− 1)
)α , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (13)
Without loss of generality, let the utility function ui(x) for the agent i be
ui(x) = e
Ei(x)/~ .
In this case, the agent i tries to maximize the utility function ui(x) instead of
maximizing the objective function Ei(x) where the former task is fully equiva-
lent to the latter. Accordingly, the simple form (13) of cooperative optimization
becomes exactly same as the iterative update function (7) for the action payoff
function Ψi(xi, t). The assignment probability function pi(xi, t) of agent i in (13)
is called the strategy of player i in (7).
Some Computational Properties of Cooperative Optimization In the
simple form (13) of cooperative optimization, we can replace the constant α by
λ(t)wij , where both λ(t) and wij are parameters, i.e.,
Ψi(xi, t) =
∑
∼xi

eEi(x)/~∏
j 6=i
(
Ψ¯j(xj , t− 1)
)λ(t)wij

 . (14)
Note that a summation operator can be approximated by a maximization
operator as follows:
max
x
ef(x)/~ ≈
∑
x
ef(x)/~ .
(Under the assumption that the function f(x) has a unique global maximum.)
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Such an approximation becomes accurate when ~→ 0+, i.e.,
lim
~→0+
(
max
x
ef(x)/~ −
∑
x
ef(x)/~
)
= 0 .
With this approximation, the iterative update function (14) becomes
Ψi(xi, t) = max
∼xi

eEi(x)/~∏
j 6=i
(
Ψ¯j(xj , t− 1)
)λ(t)wij

 .
Taking the logarithm of the both sides, we have
Ψi(xi, t) = max
∼xi

Ei(x) + λ(t)∑
j 6=i
wijΨj(xj , t− 1)

 . (15)
This is the original general form of cooperative optimization.
In this form, each agent optimizes an objective function defined at the right
side of the above equation. It is called the compromised objective function in the
sense that it is the linear combination of the original objective function Ei(x)
for agent i and the assignment state functions Ψj(xj , t− 1) of other agents j at
the previous time instance t − 1. Given a variable value xi, the function value
Ψi(xi, t) stores the maximal value of the compromised objective function with
the i-th variable fixed to the value.
Let x˜i(t) be the value of xi with the highest function value Ψi(xi, t), i.e.,
x˜i(t) = argmax
xi
Ψi(xi, t) . (16)
That value represents the best value of xi at iteration time instance t for maxi-
mizing the compromised objective function defined at the right side of (15). The
solution of the system at iteration time instance t is the collection of those best
values as follows
(x˜1(t), x˜2(t), . . . , x˜n(t)), simply x˜(t) .
All of the parameters wijs together form a n×nmatrix called the propagation
matrixW . To have
∑
iEi(x) as the global utility function to be maximized, it is
required that the propagation matrixW = (wij)n×n is non-negative, irreducible,
aperiodic, and satisfying
n∑
i=1
wij = 1, for j = 1, 2, . . . , n .
Theorem 3. Given a constant cooperation strength λ of a non-negative value
less than 1 (0 ≤ λ < 1), the general form (15) of cooperative optimization has
one and only one equilibrium. It always converges to the unique equilibrium with
an exponential rate regardless of initial conditions.
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To be more general, assume that the objective function Ei(x) for agent i is
defined on variable set Xi. Recall that the solution at iteration t is x˜(t) (see
(16)). Let x˜(t)(Xi) denote the restriction of the solution on Xi.
Definition 2. The solution x˜(t) is called a consensus solution if it is the optimal
solution for each optimization problem defined by (15). That is,
x˜(t)(Xi) = argmax
Xi

Ei(x) + λ(t)∑
j 6=i
wijΨj(xj , t− 1)

 , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Theorem 4. If the general form (15) of cooperative optimization converges to
a consensus equilibrium with a constant λ satisfying 0 ≤ λ < 1, then it must be
the global optimum of the global objective function E1(x) +E2(x) + · · ·+En(x).
From (15), we can see that the agents can increase the chance of reaching a
consensus when the value of the parameter λ is increased. However, when λ ≥ 1,
it is no longer guaranteed that any consensus equilibrium is the global optimum.
Also, the uniqueness of equilibrium is no longer guaranteed. Assume that the
maximization of Ei(x), for any i, also leads to the maximization of the global
objective function E(x). Then, when λ→∞, the cooperative optimization (15)
falls back to local search, a classic optimization method (see Section 3.5 in [9]).
A local search algorithm can have many local optimal solutions and the number
of them may grow exponentially with the problem size.
In summary, the cooperative optimization algorithm (15) is absolutely stable
when the cooperation strength λ is less than one (λ < 1). Above that value, the
number of equilibria may grow with the value. As a consequence, the algorithm
may become less stable because it can get stuck into one equilibrium or another.
On the other hand, the chance of reaching a consensus equilibrium increases.
A consensus equilibrium is guaranteed to be the global optimal one only when
λ < 1. Hence, the performance of the algorithm usually peaks at some positive
value for the cooperation strength λ. It deteriorates when the value is moved
away from the best performing value, either further up or further down towards
the value zero.
The above investigations are not on a rigorous basis. The exact performance
of the cooperative optimization algorithm (15) in relationship with the cooper-
ation strength λ is an open question.
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